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Abstract
Financial development is vulnerable to social conflict. Conflict reduces the demand for
domestic currency as a medium of exchange and a store of value. Conflict also leads to
poor quality governance, including weak regulation of the financial system, thereby
undermining the sustainability of financial institutions. Conflict therefore reduces the
social return to financial liberalization and other financial-sector reforms. This paper
presents a theoretical model integrating the effects of conflict and financial
liberalization, and then tests the model on data for 79 countries. Using an explanatory
variable that measures the intensity of conflict (from low to high) the results show that
conflict significantly reduces financial development, and that this negative effect
increases as conflict intensifies. The paper concludes that conflict reduction is essential
if financial reform is to have its full benefit for development.
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Introduction

Financial development is often discussed as if it is merely a technical process that can
be organized in a social vacuum. However, the increasing use of money in transactions
and as a store of value, together with the creation of financial instruments that
intermediate between lenders and borrowers, are all examples of institution-building.
And building good institutions requires a measure of social stability. Unfortunately,
violence is a fact of life for many people in the developing world: the last ten years or so
have seen 56 major armed conflicts in 44 different locations (Sollenberg and
Wallensteen 2001). Most of these are civil wars in low-income developing countries
and countries in transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Conflict has two major effects on the domestic financial system. First, it lowers
confidence in the domestic currency: people fear the high inflation (often
hyperinflation) that is frequently associated with conflict (as the authorities loosen fiscal
and monetary policy to finance war, or lose control of the supply of currency). The
currency also tends to depreciate in these circumstances (either through devaluation of
the official exchange rate or, if the latter is inflexible, through a depreciation in the
parallel-market rate). The demand for domestic currency therefore falls, and the demand
for other stores of value (precious metals, foreign currency, and real assets) rises.
Examples of the loss of confidence in the domestic-currency during civil war include
the Confederacy in the American civil war and, more recently, Afghanistan, Angola,
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and the former Yugoslavia.
Second, conflict undermines governance, one dimension of which is the prudential
regulation and supervision of the financial system (Addison 2002). Legislation to
protect the public interest is either not forthcoming or it is not enforced. Unsound banks
are licensed, and unsound lending practices are not restrained. The resulting financial
crises undermine public confidence in the formal financial system, and the use (and
availability) of formal financial-instruments contracts (savings accounts in particular).1
While any society can suffer from a failure of financial regulation, conflict-affected
countries are especially vulnerable because democratic oversight of public policy is
often weak (Addison et al. 2001a, 2001b).
It is important to note that conflict takes many forms and that its intensity varies. This
can range from infrequent guerrilla attacks that inflict relatively minor damage on a
country’s institutions and economy to a full-blown civil war involving protracted and
extended fighting together with mass population displacement. We would therefore
expect a conflict’s negative effects on the financial system to vary with its intensity.
We can also expect conflict to influence the effectiveness of financial-sector reform, in
particular reform’s benefits will tend to fall as conflict intensifies. Any positive effect
on savings and investment from the liberalization of ceilings on savings and loan rates

1 For example, as a result of conflict and financial repression in the 1970s and 1980s the ratio of
M2/GDP in Uganda fell from about 25 per cent in the early 1970s to only 6 per cent in 1991, and the
ratio of credit to GDP declined from 18 per cent to 4 per cent over the same period (Aleem and
Kasekende 1999: 4).
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will be weakened, and probably offset entirely in countries suffering a high intensity of
conflict since the public’s willingness to hold financial-instruments denominated in
domestic currency will decline strongly. Conflict will also impede the enforcement of
any new legislation or the use of any new institutional mechanisms to improve the
prudential supervision of the financial system. In summary, the social returns to
financial reform are likely to be lower in societies affected by conflict than in stable
societies.
This paper addresses the issues beginning, in section 2, with a theoretical framework.
Our framework uses Tobin’s (1969) portfolio-balance model to analyse the choices that
agents make in holding domestic currency versus alternative stores of value (such as
precious metals, foreign currency, and other hedges) in conflict-affected countries. The
model is also used to explore the impact of financial liberalization in a conflict context.
Section 3 then explores the issue empirically, with a test of the model on data for 79
countries. Since the intensity of conflict is important (and not just whether the country is
in conflict or not), our empirical model includes an explanatory variable which
measures conflict intensity from high to low. We find that conflict significantly reduces
financial development, and that this negative effect is increasing in conflict’s intensity.
The paper concludes, in section 4, that conflict resolution is essential if financial reform
is to have its full benefit for development.
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Theoretical framework

This section provides the motivating model for the econometric estimations below. It is
based upon the classic Tobin (1969) multi-asset or portfolio-balance model. In this
setting, various assets (stores of value) are gross substitutes for each other, provided
there are three or more assets. The analysis in this section also draws on Taylor’s (1983,
chapter 5) extension of the Tobin model for developing countries.
Under the Tobin portfolio-balance approach, macroeconomic policy (monetary or
fiscal) functions by altering the composition of the portfolios of wealth-holders. Policies
are deemed successful, in terms of increasing investment demand and national income,
if they induce a greater holding of real productive assets such as capital. In a setting of
several assets much hinges on the relative substitutability among different assets that are
gross substitutes.
Following Taylor (1983, chapter 5) total wealth (W) is composed of three assets:
physical capital (K), domestic money (H) and ‘gold’ (Z) which is a hybrid asset
(consisting of such items as precious metals and foreign currency):2

W = PK + H + Pz Z

(1)

2 The hybrid asset ‘gold’ (Z) includes items whose holding is motivated by the prospects of
appreciation. It might also be extended to include investment in real estate, although this is less
relevant in conflict zones.
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P and Pz represent the market prices of capital and ‘gold’ respectively. Equation (1)
corresponds to the adding-up condition for total wealth.3 The stock of capital (K) is
fixed during the period of analysis.
H is high-powered money, equivalent to commercial bank reserves. For the sake of
simplicity, commercial banks are assumed to lend only to firms to finance working
capital (Q). But the public deposit money with banks (DP), as do firms (Df). Thus
deposits with banks’ are:
H = c( D p + D f ), D f = Q

(2)

Q represents financing of working capital, the purchase of intermediate inputs and the
payment of wages by firms’ in a cash-in-advance situation, and c represents the central
bank imposed reserve requirements on bank deposits, c < 1. Bank loans take the form of
advances to firms. Firms also borrow from the informal market, household wealth
owners in our model.
A key assumption of the model is that the interest rate (r) that clears the market for bank
loans (made only to firms) is endogenous, whereas the interest rate on deposits in banks
(rd) is an exogenous policy parameter. Raising the deposit rate is equivalent to financial
liberalization, and may induce new commercial bank entry. There could, however, be a
greater risk associated with a higher deposit rate (ÿ) accompanying financial
liberalization due to the lack of appropriate prudential bank regulation (see Murshed and
Subagjo 2002). The demand function for deposits made by the public may take the
form:
D p =h ( r, rd − ρ, π )W

(3)

The public holds a fraction of total wealth in bank deposits, whose real return is rd - h
(monetary inflation). The parameter represents the relative appreciation of the value of
‘gold’, z relative to monetary inflation h: = z – h. We postulate that h1 < 0, the
partial derivative of the demand for deposits is negatively related to loan market
clearing rate, as household wealth holders lend directly to firms. The partial derivative
with respect to the deposit rate is positive (h2 > 0), moderated by a risk factor. The
demand for deposits with banks will be declining in the relative rate of ‘gold’
appreciation, h3 < 0.
Equilibrium in the loan market (zero excess demand) takes the following form:
h( r, rd − ρ, π )W +Q −

H
=0
c

(4)

The first term represents the public’s demand for deposits in the commercial banking
sector, the second term firms’ working capital advances from banks that are redeposited less supply (the last term). The loan market clears in the loan interest rate r.
In the ‘gold’ market equilibrium takes the following form:

3 The sum of the partial derivatives of the three assets with respect to wealth must equal unity.

3

g ( r , rd − ρ, π )W − Pz Z = 0

(5)

The g(.) function represents demand for ‘gold’. We would expect the demand for ‘gold’
to fall as the net bank deposit rate rises (g2 < 0), also for demand to rise as the asset is
expected to appreciate (g3 > 0), but we postulate that g1 is ambiguous in sign.
The equilibrium condition for the third asset can be dropped by Walras’s law. Totally
differentiating (4) and (5) and arranging the results in matrix form we obtain:

 h1W
g W
 1

0   dr   −h3W
=
− 1 dPz   −g 3W

(1 − h2 )W   dπ 
(1 − g 2 )W  d ( rd − ρ )

(6)

The trace of the Jacobian is –1 + h1W < 0, and the determinant (DET) = –h1W > 0.
Therefore, the model is stable.4
We are now in a position to carry out some comparative statics exercises. We consider
two: an increase in conflict, and financial liberalization.
First of all, conflict, civil war, poor governance and political unrest raises the rate of
appreciation of ‘gold’ ( ):
dr
hW
= 3 <0
dπ DET

(7)

and
dP z [h3 g1 − h1 g 3 ]W 2
=
> 0 if g 1< 0, when g1 > 0, h1 g 3 > h3 g1
dπ
DET

(8)

An increase in the relative attractiveness of ‘gold’ will lower the equilibrium loan rate in
(7). This is because of a fall in the demand for bank deposits, as well as a decline in the
demand for loans, or working capital, by firms. As far as the equilibrium price of ‘gold’
is concerned (8) we expect it to increase, if g1 < 0. This means that as the loan rate
increases, there is a movement away from both ‘gold’ and bank deposits so as to be able
to lend directly (or informally) to firms. This represents normality, and is more likely to
be the case in a more peaceful and stable society that is on a sustained high growth path.
If, however, g1 > 0, it implies that increases in loan rates encourage more ‘gold’ holding
in addition to direct loans to firms. The decline in bank deposits, as a result of an
appreciation in ‘gold’ values, is more dramatic in this case. This is more probable in
unstable, badly managed and conflict-ridden nations. It might be argued that even in
some countries with low-intensity conflict, g1 < 0, especially during times of relative
peace. We could refer to g1 > 0, as a situation of severe or intense conflict. The
equilibrium price of ‘gold’, Pz will also rise when g1 > 0, as own price effects dominate
cross price effects.

4 The alert reader will have noticed that we do not allow total wealth, W, to alter in our analysis in (6).
This is because we are interested in alterations to the composition of wealth, and not the level of
wealth, induced by substitution effects.
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These results are depicted in Figure 1 in r and Pz space. The horizontal DD schedule
displays equilibrium in the bank deposit market. The GG schedule depicts equilibrium
in the ‘gold’ market. It is downward sloping if g1 < 0 (less conflict), which is the stable
case and depicted in Figure 1. The initial equilibrium is at point A. An increase in the
relative return on ‘gold’, shifts the DD schedule downwards, and the GG rightwards
with the new equilibrium at point B showing lower levels of r and Pz.
Figure 1
Asset market responses to conflict and financial liberalization

r

C
DD2
A

DD0
DD1
B

GG1

GG
GG2
PZ
We now turn to the second of our comparative statics exercises: financial liberalization:
examples from conflict affected countries include Ethiopia and Mozambique. A key
component of financial liberalization is the lifting of interest-rate ceilings on deposit
accounts. This amounts to an increase in the bank deposit rate in our model:
dr (h2 − 1)W >
(h − 1) > 0
=
0 if 2
drd
DET <
( h2 − 1) < 0

(9)

and
2
dPz W [( h2 −1) g1 +(1 − g 2 )h1 ] <
if ( h2 − 1) > 0, g1 < 0
=
0
drd
DET
> only if (h2 − 1) > 0, g1 > 0

(10)

Successful financial liberalization is meant to attract a greater volume of bank deposits,
and eventually encourage greater lending by formal sector banks to firms. It should also
induce a movement away from ‘gold’. The ultimate objective is to improve the process
of financial intermediation. This in turn should push up the loan market rate, r, an effect
that is reinforced if output and the demand for working capital by firms increases. There
will be two effects in operation at this juncture. The first is to do with the rise in deposit
rates (r in equation 9). The rise in the deposit rate will also raise the risk associated with
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holding such an asset under conditions of conflict and poor prudential bank regulation.
If the attractiveness of the return on bank deposits exceeds the increased risk associated
with such an activity (h2 –1 > 0), then there is successful financial liberalization,
dr/drd > 0 in (9). Secondly, the move away from ‘gold’ associated with Pz in equation
(10). In addition to the condition just stated a movement away from ‘gold’ will be
successful in (10) if g1 < 0, as in less conflict ridden countries. Also, the reduction in
‘gold’ holdings is greater the closer ‘gold’ is a substitute for bank deposits. The effects
of successive financial liberalization are illustrated in Figure 1 by a leftward shift in the
GG schedule and an upward movement of the DD schedule. The new equilibrium is at
point C associated with higher r and lower Pz.

3

Econometric investigation

3.1 The choice of variables

We now proceed to test our model on a sample of 79 countries. The choice of countries is
strictly determined by the availability of consistent data on all the variables. We consider
five types of variables in the estimation process: the financial variable, conflict variable,
control variables, governance indicators, and other explanatory variables. As we have no
data for a cross-section of countries on the second hybrid asset ‘gold’ we focus on one
asset, deposit money in banks. A fall in the demand for this asset, as a result of conflict
along with poor governance, implies an increased demand for the other asset ‘gold’ (given
our assumption that the third asset in our model, the physical capital stock, is constant
during the period of analysis).
Two alternative measures of financial development are considered: BANK and DEPTH.
The variable BANK emphasizes the risk sharing and information services that banks are
most likely to provide. It is measured as deposit money bank domestic assets divided by
deposit money bank domestic assets plus central bank deposit assets. An alternative
variable, DEPTH, measured as the ratio of M2 to GDP, is also used as a proxy for the
overall size of the formal financial intermediary sector.5 The dependent financial variable
will capture the effects of conflict on the demand for bank deposits as an asset, as well as
the impact on this asset demand of liberalization via various governance variables.
The CONFLICT variable refers to the use of armed force between two parties, of which at
least one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Fiftyone countries in the sample are categorized as conflict countries. Depending on the
intensity of the conflict, we allow for three conflict categories: Low, Medium, and High
corresponding to the alpha-numeric ranking 1, 2, and 3, respectively. From our sample, 29
per cent of countries are high conflict nations, 22 per cent medium conflict, and 14 per cent
low conflict countries. The remaining 35 per cent of the sample include countries with no
conflict. These countries are assigned a rank of zero.

5 Estimation results using the DEPTH variable are similar to those derived from using the BANK variable.
Since the BANK variable fits well with the theoretical model derived in the earlier section, only the
estimation results using the BANK variable are reported. Results for the DEPTH variable are available
from the authors.
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Per capita GDP (PCGDP) is the control variable. The rationale for using per capita GDP as
a control variable is straightforward: richer nations tend to have better scores in governance
indicators, and to have more solid and mature financial institutions.
The indicators of governance capture the likely impact of financial liberalization in the
context of risk and prudential regulation prevailing in that country (ÿ in the theoretical
section above). They not only show how governments are elected, monitored and replaced,
but also their capacity to formulate and implement public policies effectively as well as the
attitude of the electorate and their representatives toward the institutions that govern
economic, political, and social interactions. Following Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b),
five categories of governance indicators are used in this study: graft, rule of law,
government effectiveness, regulatory burden, and voice and accountability. Graft and rule
of law represents the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern their
interactions. Government effectiveness and regulatory burden, on the other hand, represent
the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies; while voice and
accountability measure the process by which those in authority are elected and replaced
(see also de Mello and Barenstein 2001). The governance variables range from –2.5 to 2.5,
where a positive number indicates good, or relatively good, governance.
The government budget deficit/surplus as a ratio of GDP (BUDGET) and the foreign
exchange regime (EXCH) are also included as explanatory variables. A very large budget
deficit can impede financial development by crowding out private demand for credit and, if
monetized, the budget deficit is inflationary, which reduces the demand for domestic
financial instruments. In the aftermath of a number of recent financial crises, the impact of
the exchange rate regime on financial stability has become one of the central components
of the debate on the appropriate exchange rate policies for countries to adopt.6 Studies by
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Hausmann et al. (1999) have begun to discuss—
primarily at the theoretical level—the potential links between exchange rate regime and
financial stability. With the exception of Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) and Domac and
Peria (2000), this issue has remained largely unexplored at the empirical level. Hence we
investigate this issue by allowing for three exchange rate categories: fixed, intermediate,
and floating.7
Thirty three countries in the sample are from Africa. An African dummy variable is
therefore used to capture adverse geographical, neighbourhood, and conflict effects.8
The governance indicators are for the 1997-98 period. The CONFLICT variable is for the
1989-97 period. The per-capita GDP is the average for the 1989-98 period, while the other

6 For an overview of the competing arguments and literature linking exchange rate regimes and financial
stability, see, among others, Domac and Peria (2000).
7 Fixed exchange rate regimes include pegs to individual currencies or to a basket. The intermediate
regimes includes crawling pegs, managed floating, and regimes that allow limited flexibility with respect
to a set of indicators. Estimations were also performed by distinguishing fixed exchange rate regimes visà-vis all other regimes. Initial results were similar to those reported here.
8 Estimations were also conducted using a battery of other explanatory variables, including the logarithm of
population, the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, and the Gini coefficient. However, none of
these variables were statistically significant. Moreover, the overall regression results were significantly
worse than those reported here.
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variables are averages for the 1980-2000 period. A detailed list of variables and sources are
given in the data Appendix.
3.2 Estimation results

First, to set the stage, the 51 conflict-prone countries in the sample are ranked by the
intensity of the CONFLICT variable. The financial variable, BANK, is inversely related
to CONFLICT across the three groups shown in Table 1. The asterisk next to the
average BANK variable in the countries with low intensity conflict, 0.398, indicates that
this ratio is significantly larger than in the countries with medium conflict intensity (at
the 0.05 level in a one-tailed, homoskedastic t-test, i.e., assuming equal variance), as
indicated by the t-statistic within parentheses below. The critical t-value is 1.66.
Likewise, the average BANK variable for the middle conflict intensity group, 0.253, is
significantly larger than in the high conflict intensity countries. The F-value in the
bottom line, 12.1, also exceeds the critical value, 2.89, indicating significant differences
among the three average values of BANK reported (at the 0.05 level). Thus countries
with high conflict intensity tend to be associated with lower average values for the
financial variable, BANK. In fact, the figure for high conflict economies is nearly a
quarter of that for low conflict countries, indicating a significantly lower demand for
money as an asset in high conflict countries. The scatter plot and simple regression line
shown in Figure 2 confirm this pattern.

Table 1
The BANK variable and countries with different CONFLICT intensity (n=51)
Level of
CONFLICT Intensity
Low [1]
(t-statistics)
Medium [2]
(t-statistics)
High [3]
(t-statistics)
F-value

BANK

No. of countries

0.398*
(4.28)

11

0.253*
(5.71)

17

0.116*
(6.40)

23

12.1*

Note:
An asterisk * next to the BANK variable indicates that the average value is significantly different
from the average value shown next below, at the 0.05 level. An asterisk and t-statistics in the third
line refer to a comparison with the first line. An asterisk next to an F-value in the bottom line means
that it exceeds the critical value, which is 3.1 in this case. Figures in [ ] next to each level of conflict
intensity show the number used to measure that particular level of intensity in the data set.
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Figure 2
Bank vs. conflict resolution
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The econometric analysis is based on a reduced-form equation that relates the financial
indicator variable to the intensity of conflict while controlling for other factors that may
affect financial stability in a country. In particular, based on the theoretical model
presented earlier in the paper, we initially estimate the following equation:
BANKij = a0j + a1jCONFLICTij + a2jPCGDPij + a3jDij + a4jGij + uij

(11)

where Gij represent the jth governance index, with j=(1,...,5), for the ith country in the
sample; BANKij and CONFLICTaij denote the financial indicator and the conflict
variable, respectively, in country i when indicator j is used as the governance indicator;
Dij is a vector of other explanatory variables; and uij is an error term. Equation (11) is
estimated separately for each of the five governance indicators. The results from the five
different models are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Cross-section regressions with BANK as the dependent variable
(with no AFRICA dummy variable)
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

CONFLICT

-0.245
(3.15)

-0.212
(2.98)

-0.319
(4.12)

-0.298
(5.19)

-0.276
(4.94)

PCGDP

0.082
(3.55)

0.071
(3.10)

0.025
(2.56)

0.098
(2.18)

0.067
(2.83)

BUDGET

-0.480
(3.22)

-0.528
(2.86)

-0.425
(3.85)

-0.419
(4.10)

-0.688
(3.00)

EXCH

0.423
(3.10)

0.651
(4.18)

0.494
(3.90)

0.810
(4.75)

0.772
(3.19)

GRAFT

0.242
(3.99)

LAW

0.574
(4.19)

EFFECTIVE

0.670
(5.95)

REGULATORY

0.358
(4.38)

VOICE
2

0.644
(5.10)

adj. R

0.43

0.50

0.48

0.49

0.51

n

79

79

79

79

79

Note: The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of White’s heteroscedasticity consistent tstatistics.

Irrespective of the governance indicator used, the results are consistent across all the
models. Positive coefficients for all of the governance indicators indicate a positive
relation between good governance and regulatory capacity to the demand for money as
an asset. CONFLICT has a statistically significant negative impact on BANK. The
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are significantly high. The results
support the hypothesis that the higher the intensity of conflict in a country, the lower the
stability of the financial system. The coefficient of the per capita GDP is positive
indicating that countries with higher levels of income, a proxy for development, usually
experience a more stable financial system. Observe that the negative coefficient of
10

CONFLICT in Table 2 is highest when regressed along with EFFECTIVE, which is the
best overall indicator of governance of all the five qualitative variables considered. Thus
the presence of conflict and the absence of an effective government exert the greatest
downward pressure on money demand.
The exchange rate regime has a positive and statistically significant impact on the financial
indicator variable. This provides some support for the view that the adoption of a more
flexible exchange rate system offers the possibility to run a more stabilizing monetary
policy. The exchange rate could be used to absorb some of the real shocks that an economy
faces. More precisely, confronted with an adverse external shock, a flexible exchange rate
regime can let the exchange rate bear the brunt of the adjustment so that the interest rate
need not be raised. Thus, output is protected through increased competitiveness and more
favourable financial conditions.
The budget deficit variable has negative impact on the BANK variable suggesting that
higher budget deficits reduce the attractiveness of money as an asset. Each one of the five
governance indicator variables has a positive and statistically significant impact on the
financial indicator variable. Of special significance is the coefficient on the regulatory
burden variable. This provides support to our hypothesis that people do not want to put
their money on deposit as banking regulation and supervision get worse with increasing
conflict.
Next, equation (11) is reestimated after including an AFRICA country dummy to identify
the African countries in the sample where the intensity of conflict is usually the highest.
The results are reported in Table 3. The coefficient on the AFRICA dummy variable is
negative and statistically significant suggesting that the African countries are more likely
to have an unstable financial system than countries from other continents. Results for the
remaining variables are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2, but quantitatively
the magnitude of the CONFLICT and other governance variables are declining. This
suggests that the intensity of conflict is greater in Africa, and governance indicators are
worse in that region. It also implies that the Africa regional dummy goes some of the way
to explaining good (or poor) governance and bad neighbourhood effects.
Finally, an interaction term of AFRICA and CONFLICT is added to equation (11). The
estimation results are shown in Table 4. Irrespective of the governance indicator employed,
the interaction term turns out to be negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, the
CONFLICT variable loses much of its statistical significance compared to the previous
two tables. The governance indicators decline in magnitude, except for GRAFT and LAW.
Since the regulatory framework is more important for the type of dependent variable we
consider, this result implies that the interaction of AFRICA and CONFLICT accounts for
some of the poor regulatory framework, except for the effects via GRAFT and LAW. The
results in both Tables 3 and 4 give further evidence on the negative effects of CONFLICT
on financial deepening as measured by the BANK variable. Findings for the remaining
variables in Table 4 are, again, qualitatively similar to those reported earlier in Table 2.

11

Table 3
Cross-section regressions with BANK as the dependent variable
(with AFRICA dummy variable)
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

CONFLICT

-0.103
(2.55)

-0.135
(2.07)

-0.201
(3.10)

-0.156
(3.16)

-0.188
(2.94)

PCGDP

0.247
(4.10)

0.154
(5.19)

0.239
(6.16)

0.319
(5.18)

0.322
(4.87)

BUDGET

-0.410
(4.89)

-0.390
(5.33)

-0.378
(5.90)

-0.644
(6.10)

-0.518
(6.88)

EXCH

0.193
(2.53)

0.181
(2.63)

0.381
(3.19)

0.264
(4.89)

0.299
(7.10)

GRAFT

0.217
(5.10)

LAW

0.281
(5.58)

EFFECTIVE

0.414
(8.19)

REGULATORY

0.321
(7.88)

VOICE
AFRICA
2

adj. R
n

0.298
(4.10)
-0.402
(3.85)

-0.398
(4.10)

-0.444
(4.39)

-0.697
(6.32)

-0.510
(5.93)

0.59

0.55

0.57

0.53

0.59

79

79

79

79

79

Note: The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of White’s heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics.
Table 4
Cross-section regressions with BANK as the dependent variable
(with AFRICA*CONFLICT interaction term)
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

CONFLICT

-0.067
(2.45)

-0.044
(1.99)

-0.089
(2.16)

-0.083
(2.09)

-0.100
(2.26)

PCGDP

0.265
(3.82)

0.210
(3.77)

0.259
(5.14)

0.203
(4.67)

0.188
(4.10)

BUDGET

-0.553
(5.18)

-0.642
(5.90)

-0.488
(4.81)

-0.561
(5.33)

-0.617
(6.12)

EXCH

0.314
(2.80)

0.288
(3.27)

0.421
(4.25)

0.477
(5.46)

0.315
(4.19)

GRAFT

0.441
(5.27)

LAW

0.387
(3.82)

EFFECTIVE

0.297
(3.25)

REGULATORY

0.282
(3.97)

VOICE
AFRICA*CONFLICT
2

adj. R
n

0.231
(4.90)
-0.631
(4.49)

-0.697
(5.91)

-0.772
(6.30)

-0.492
(5.44)

-0.546
(6.04)

0.55

0.54

0.55

0.51

0.58

79

79

79

79

79

Note: The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of White’s heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics.
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3.3

Baseline regressions and sensitivity analysis

Most cross-country studies consider only a small number of explanatory variables in
trying to establish a statistically significant relationship between any two specific
variables. In our study, economic theory does not provide a complete specification of
which variables are to be held constant when statistical tests are performed on the
relation between a financial variable and conflict (Cooley and LeRoy 1981). Thus it is
likely that many candidate regressions may have equal theoretical basis, but the
coefficient estimates on the conflict variable may depend on the conditioning set of
information. In order to investigate the robustness of coefficient estimates, reported in
the earlier section, to changes in the conditioning set of information, a test using a
variation of Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds analysis, as suggested in Levine and
Renelt (1992), is employed.
In particular, the following baseline regression is estimated:
BANK = a + bmM + biI + bzZ + u

(12)

where M is the Conflict variable, I is the set of base variables included in all regressions
and Z is a subset of variables selected from a pool of variables identified by past studies
as potential important explanatory variables of BANK.9
We first select the CONFLICT variable (M), and run a base regression that includes
only the I-variables and CONFLICT. Then we compute the regression results for all
possible linear combinations of up to three Z variables and identify the lowest and
highest values for the coefficient of the CONFLICT variable, bm, that cannot be rejected
at the 5 per cent level of significance. If the estimated coefficient of CONFLICT
remains significant over this procedure, the correlation is said to be ‘robust’. The
‘extreme bounds’ are the highest estimated correlation plus two standard errors and the
lowest minus two standard errors. If the coefficient fails to be significant in some
regression, the correlation is termed as ‘fragile’. Widmalm (2001) has suggested that, to
reduce multicollinearity, no pair of variables in I, Z, or M should measure the same
underlying phenomenon.
Following Levine and Renelt (1992) and Widmalm (2001), the set of variables in the I
set are as follows: a lagged value of the log of per capita GDP, an exchange rate regime
variable, and the average annual growth rate of population.10
The pool from which the set of control variables Z is drawn includes variables that are
considered to be potential determinants of the BANK variable. The first variable is the
Export/GDP ratio which measures the degree of openness of the country’s economy.
The ratio of the government’s budget deficit/surplus to GDP since fiscal policy affects

9 Following Kormendi and Meguire (1985), it is assumed that the explanatory variables in equation (1) are
independent and linear.
10 Although few empirical studies in the growth literature include all of these three variables, most studies
control for some subset. Levine and Renelt (1991) survey forty-one studies on economic growth and
provides a list of variables included in these studies. Moreover, these variables are consistent with new
growth models that depend on constant returns to reproducible inputs or endogenous technological change
(Barro 1990, Romer 1990).
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development for the reasons given earlier. These two variables help to control for
differences in total factor productivity. The Gini coefficient is included to represent the
income distribution in the country. Finally, the five governance indicators are also
included as control variables.
The extreme bound results for estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 5. The
correlation between BANK and the CONFLICT variable turns out to be robust. The
coefficients are negative and statistically significant suggesting that conflict retards
financial deepening and, thus, financial growth. Irrespective of the variables included in
the Z set, the relationship between CONFLICT and BANK appears to be consistent.
This provides empirical support to the robustness of the results presented in Tables 2-4
and rules out multicollinearity.
Table 5
Results from the extreme bound analysis of the BANK and CONFLICT variables
M-Variable
CONFLICT

CONFLICT

CONFLICT

CONFLICT

CONFLICT

Bound

2

bm

R

high

-0.204
(4.76)

0.51

base

-0.245
(4.37)

0.49

low

-0.267
(3.89)

0.48

GRAFT

high

-0.181
(4.23)

0.47

LAW, BUDGET, EXP/GDP

base

-0.202
(4.24)

0.48

Z
GRAFT, BUDGET, EXP/GDP

low

-0.234

0.49

LAW

high

-0.226
(3.20)

0.51

EFFECTIVE, BUDGET, EXP/GDP

base

-0.288
(3.93)

0.49

low

-0.303

0.52

EFFECTIVE

high

-0.344
(2.55)

0.50

REGULATORY, BUDGET, EXP/GDP

base

-0.324
(3.66)

0.51

low

-0.320
(4.10)

0.49

REGULATORY

high

-0.099
(2.57)

0.51

VOICE, BUDGET, EXP/GDP

base

-0.123
(3.06)

0.53

low

-0.175
(3.47)

0.55

VOICE

Note: The base ‘b’ is the estimated coefficient of the M-variable in equation (2) when BANK is regressed, using
2SLS, on the M- and I-variables. The high ‘b’ is the estimated coefficient from the regression with the extreme
high bound (bm + two standard deviations); the low ‘b’ is the coefficient from the regression with the extreme lower
bound. The I variables are the per capita GDP, gini coefficient, and foreign exchange regime. In the Z column are
the additional variables that produce the extreme bounds (high and low, respectively). These variables are the
governance indicators, Export/GDP ratio (EXP/GDP), and Government budget surplus(deficit)/GDP ratio
(BUDGET). The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of White’s heteroscedasticity consistent tstatistics.
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3.4

Long run impact multipliers

In order to analyse the effect of a change in each explanatory variable on financial
depth, the method described in Chowdhury (2001) is utilized to calculate the long run
impact multipliers. The multipliers measure the long run influence of a unit change in
the explanatory variable and are reported in Table 6 and graphed in Figures 3 to 6.
Table 7 summarizes the ranking of the variables. The values suggest that in our sample
countries conflict, fiscal policy, and various governance indicators have a significant
adverse effect on financial depth.
Table 6
Effect of long-run impact multiplier on financial depth
CONFLICT
Variables

High intensity

Medium intensity

Low intensity

No conflict

CONFLICT

-5.18

-4.32

-3.70

-

BUDGET

-3.71

-3.60

-3.88

-2.26

GRAFT

-2.45

-2.80

-2.14

-1.46

LAW

-1.96

-2.04

-1.72

-1.04

EFFECTIVE

-4.08

-3.12

-2.80

-2.18

REGULATORY

-4.20

-3.66

-3.96

-2.72

VOICE

-3.04

-2.76

-2.30

-1.66

The figures represent the percentage change in financial depth due to a unit change in each of the
explanatory variables.

Table 7
Ranking of variables in order of long run impact on financial depth
Intensity of CONFLICT
High

Medium

Low

No CONFLICT

CONFLICT

CONFLICT

REGULATORY

REGULATORY

REGULATORY

REGULATORY

BUDGET

BUDGET

EFFECTIVE

BUDGET

CONFLICT

EFFECTIVE

BUDGET

EFFECTIVE

EFFECTIVE

VOICE

VOICE

GRAFT

VOICE

GRAFT

GRAFT

VOICE

GRAFT

LAW

LAW

LAW

LAW
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Figure 3
Impact multiplier: high intensity conflict
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Figure 4
Impact multiplier: medium intensity conflict
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Figure 5
Impact multiplier: low intensity conflict
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Figure 6
Impact multiplier: no conflict
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The presence of CONFLICT is found to be extremely costly in terms of a long-run
reduction in financial depth. The presence of high intensity conflict is, for example,
responsible for a long-run reduction in financial depth by 5.18 per cent. The
corresponding reduction in countries with medium and low intensity conflict are 4.32
and 3.70 per cent, respectively. More interestingly, a reduction in the intensity of
conflict from high to medium would lead to a 16.6 per cent drop in the reduction in
financial depth. A similar shift from a medium to low intensity conflict would lead to a
14.4 per cent drop in the reduction in financial depth. Hence any policy measures that
would reduce the intensity of conflict would go a long way to enhancing financial
deepening in the developing countries.
Among the variables considered, the presence of conflict, in the countries with high and
medium intensity conflict, has the highest long-run adverse effect on financial depth. In
the high intensity conflict countries, two governance indicators—EFFECTIVE and
REGULATORY—follow conflict in their adverse effect on financial depth. A
worsening of the regulatory indicator reduces depth by 4.2 per cent while a similar
worsening in the effective indicator leads to a 4.08 per cent reduction. Fiscal policy, as
measured by the budget deficit (BUDGET), reduces depth by 3.71 per cent.
Similar results can be seen in the countries with medium intensity conflict. The
CONFLICT variable has the highest long-run adverse effect on depth (see Figure 4). It
is followed by REGULATORY, BUDGET, and EFFECTIVE variables, respectively.
The net impact on depth of each of these variables are smaller in magnitude than the
results for the high conflict intensity countries. This confirms our previous findings that
the more intense the conflict, the higher will be the magnitude of the adverse effect that
other variables have on financial depth.
Interesting results are found in the low conflict intensity countries. The CONFLICT
variable is no longer the largest contributor to the long-run adverse impact on depth (see
Figure 5). REGULATORY and BUDGET variables reduce financial depth in the long
run by 3.96 and 3.88 per cent, respectively; while CONFLICT reduces depth by 3.7 per
cent.
Overall, the value of the multipliers from the countries with no conflict (last column in
Table 6) are smaller in magnitude than those from the conflict-prone countries.
REGULATORY, BUDGET, and EFFECTIVE variables have the highest long-run
adverse effects on depth. The REGULATORY variable leads the list with a value of
2.72 per cent and is followed by the BUDGET at 2.26 per cent.
Finally, irrespective of the intensity of conflict, GRAFT, LAW and VOICE appear to
have a relatively smaller adverse impact on financial depth.

4

Conclusions

This paper has argued that conflict has a significantly negative effect on financial
development, and that this effect increases as the intensity of conflict increases. Conflict
both lowers the demand for the domestic currency as an asset, and causes a deterioration
in governance which weakens financial-sector regulation. These effects of conflict
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remain valid even after dummy variables for Africa (which has a high share of
contemporary conflicts and a poor record of governance) are included.
Several policy conclusions follow from these results. First, measures to reduce conflict
are not only desirable from a humanitarian perspective, they also have positive effects
on economic development. Therefore the prevention and resolution of conflict—through
democratization, better peace-keeping, and broad-based reconstruction—need more
support from the international community. Second, it follows that financial reform will
have more positive effects when complemented by conflict-reducing measures. The
benefits of reform to the countries themselves will be higher, and the effectiveness of
aid in support of such reform will also be greater. Third, while it is highly desirable to
eliminate conflict entirely—from both humanitarian and economic-development
perspectives—we have shown that there are still substantial gains from the more modest
objective of lowering the level of conflict (from either high intensity to medium
intensity, or from medium intensity to low intensity). This is encouraging given the
longstanding and complex nature of many conflicts in poor countries, and the time and
effort which is often required to achieve complete peace.
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Appendix

The sample includes the following 79 countries. The letter ‘c’ within parentheses besides a
country denotes the countries with conflict.
African countries

Algeria (c)
Angola (c)
Burkina Faso
Burundi (c)
Cameroon (c)
Chad (c)
Congo, Dem. Rep. (c)
Congo, Rep. of (c)
Côte d’Ivoire
Eritrea (c)
Ethiopia (c)

Ghana
Guinea-Bissau (c)
Kenya
Lesotho (c)
Liberia (c)
Malawi
Mali (c)
Morocco
Mozambique (c)
Niger (c)
Nigeria

Rwanda (c)
Senegal (c)
Sierra Leone (c)
Somalia (c)
South Africa (c)
Sudan (c)
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia (c)
Uganda (c)
Zambia

Guatemala (c)
Haiti (c)
Honduras
India (c)
Indonesia (c)
Iran (c)
Iraq (c)
Israel (c)
Jamaica
Laos (c)
Lebanon (c)
Libya (c)
Macedonia (c)
Madagascar
Malaysia
Maldives

Mexico
Myanmar (c)
Nepal (c)
Nicaragua (c)
Pakistan (c)
Paraguay
Peru (c)
Philippines (c)
Singapore
Sri Lanka (c)
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela (c)
Yemen (c)

Non-African countries

Argentina
Azerbaijan (c)
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina (c)
Brazil
Cambodia (c)
Chile
Colombia (c)
Costa Rica
Croatia (c)
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt (c)
El Salvador (c)
Georgia (c)
VARIABLES USED
I.

FINANCIAL VARIABLES

Two indicators of financial development have been used:
(i)
DEPTH: a proxy for the overall size of the formal financial intermediary sector,
measured as M2/GDP.
Source: IFS (lines 34 + 35)/line 99b.
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(ii)
BANK: emphasizes the risk sharing and information services that banks are most
likely to provide. Measured as deposit money bank domestic assets divided by deposit
money bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets.
Source: IFS (lines 12a-f)/[(lines 12a-f)+(lines 22a-f)].
II.

CONFLICT

(i)
low intensity armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer
than 1000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict.
(ii)
medium intensity armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an
accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths, but fewer than 1000 deaths per year.
(iii)

high intensity armed conflict: at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.

Source: Data based on Wallensteen, P. and M. Sollenberg, ‘Armed Conflict and Conflict
Complexes, 1989-97’, Journal of Peace Research, 35(5), 1998, 621-34; and updated by
the Uppsala conflict Data Project: States in Armed Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden.
III.

CONTROL VARIABLES

PCGDP: Per capita GDP.
Source: IFS—line 99b/line 99z.
POP: Population.
Source: IFS—line 99z.
IV.

GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

(i)
GRAFT: measures the perception of corruption, generally defined as the exercise
of public power for private gain.
(ii)
LAW: represents the rule of law which includes several indicators measuring the
extent to which agents have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society.
(iii) EFFECTIVE: measures government effectiveness which combines perception of
the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of
civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies.
(iv)
REGULATORY: represents regulatory burden and includes measures of the
incidence of market-unfriendly policies, such as price controls or inadequate bank
supervision, as well as perception of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in
several areas, such as foreign trade and business development, among others.
(v)
VOICE: this represents voice and accountability and is composed of several
measures relating to the political process, civil liberties, and political rights.
The governance indicators are measured in units ranging from about –2.5 to 2.5, with
higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes.
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Sources: Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), ‘Aggregating
Governance Indicators’, World Bank Discussion Paper Series No. 2195.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (1999b), ‘Governance Matters’,
World Bank Discussion Paper Series No. 2196.
V.

OTHER VARIABLES

(i)

EXCH: represents the exchange rate regime.
0 for fixed exchange rate
1 for managed or floating exchange rate

Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate
Restrictions.
(ii)

EXP/GDP:measures the ratio of exports to GDP.

Source: IFS—line 70/line 99b.
(iii)

GOVTEX/GDP: the ratio of government expenditures to GDP.

Source: IFS—line 82/line 99b.
(iv)

BUDGET: the ratio of budget surplus (deficit) to GDP.

Source: IFS—line 80.
(v)

GINI: measures income inequality.

Source: Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire (1996) ‘A New Data Set Measuring Income
Inequality’, World Bank Economic Review, 10, 565-591.
(vi)

AFRICA: 1 if the country is in Africa.
0 if the country is not in Africa
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